Using retrospective data analysis, this paper looks at the potential effects that the EU financial transaction tax would have on registered Austrian funds. We use original data for 927 investment funds over a 12-month trading period covering the 2014 calendar year. We analyse its effect on total net assets and on performance. We find that the cost of FTT on Austrian funds for 2014 would be € 89.5 million. The effect of FTT differs between funds and is influenced by fund category, gilt-edged securities held, risk and investment strategy. Behavioural changes in the market would likely arise in these areas if FTT were to be introduced.
Several investment funds operating within Europe argue that a FTT will significantly affect long-term returns of investors (Black Rock, 2011; Oxera, 2011; AIMA Report, 2012; European Fund and Asset Management Association, 2013; Davis et al., n.d.) . The
Commission Services (n.d.: 3) discussed the impact that FTT could have on financial institutions, noting that the impact will depend on both the asset allocation (portfolio) and the investment strategy (SWD (2013) 28 final).
This paper analyses the effects of a potential FTT as designed in the proposed Directive, based on monthly returns of 927 Austrian investment funds. The Austrian fund sector has increased substantially over the past two decades. Supported by strong credit ratings by international bodies and a stable political environment, the total net assets of mutual funds have increased 192% since 1998, while for the same period total assets of Austrian pension funds have increased 307% (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, n.d.). The important position that Austrian funds have developed is reflected also in the high value of total net assets held by the funds analysed within our data. As the Austrian fund sector is now well established, we assume that our conclusions are not only Austria-specific, but that they are relevant for funds across Europe. For 2014, closing monthly total net assets for all funds in our data set was € 67 billion.
We focus on two research questions: First, how large is the effect of the proposed FTT on investment funds, in particular on their performance and their total net assets? Second, which types of investment funds 2 are particularly affected? FTT seeks to be neutral, but differing fund types; the number of transactions within a chain of transfer of instruments; and different investment strategies and risk profiles cause FTT to affect funds in different ways.
We use confidential, anonymised, disaggregated data of investment funds that have been provided by the Austrian Kontrollbank (Oesterreichische Kontrollbank, OeKB) 3 and the
Association of Austrian Investment Companies (Vereinigung Österreichischer
Data provided included a total of 21 different categories of funds. This included investments in socially responsible funds, gilt-edged securities, real estate funds and asset-and mortgage-based funds. 3 The Austrian Kontrollbank (Oesterreichische Kontrollbank Aktiengesellschaft, OeKB) is Austria's main provider of financial and information services to the export industry and the capital market.
Investmentgesellschaften, VÖIG),
4 with the consent of each investment fund. The data are unique and cover specific investment funds operating in Austria during the 12-month period from January to December 2014. 5 Key information provided includes gross sales and purchases of derivative and non-derivative financial instruments, on which we apply the FTT rates as suggested in the Proposal. In contrasting the actual returns of funds with the hypothetical returns after FTT, we measure the effect of the FTT as the tax wedge.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional background of the Proposal, while section 3 outlines related literature and our hypothesis.
Data and methodology are outlined in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 offers conclusions.
Institutional Background
As unanimity amongst Member States has not been achieved, the FTT Proposal of The Association of Austrian Investment Companies is an umbrella organization for all Austrian investment fund management companies and all Austrian real estate investment fund management companies.
5
Data represent 100% of all Austrian funds held domestically. 6 This includes "all markets (regulated and over-the-counter), all actors (from traditional banks via the so-called shadow-banking sector to non-financial companies that undertake significant financial transactions) and all products (from shares and bonds to derivatives and structured products) " European Commission (n.d.), p.3. derivatives the rate is 0.01% of the gross value of each transaction, before netting and settlement (Article 9(2), COM(2013) 71 final). FTT is therefore similar to other indirect taxes that ignore profitability. In all other cases the rate amounts to 0.1% (Article 9(2), COM(2013) 71 final). Financial transactions covered by the Proposal include (i) the purchase and sale of instruments, (ii) transfers between group entities where the right to dispose of as owner and the transfer of the risk is associated, (iii) the conclusion of derivatives contracts (iv) exchanges of financial instruments and (v) repurchase agreements (Article 2(2), COM (2013) 71 final). FTT is charged on each leg of a transaction, i.e. at the seller and at the buyer, including all intermediaries. In a series of transactions, FTT is levied multiple times, on gross values without deductions. Figure 1 below illustrates the FTT implications of a simple transaction (Davis et al., n.d.) and illustrates the substantial cascading effect that could arise from the introduction of FTT. In this case, one transaction between two asset managers involves five further intermediaries, and FTT is levied 10 times. As gross values increase along the value chain, the ultimate cascading effect may be very significant. Under the assumption that each seller in the chain will shift the FTT burden to the next buyer, all FTT accumulates at the end of that chain, i.e. Asset Manager 2. For them, the accumulated FTT is a transaction cost, which -in case of an investment fund -will ultimately reduce the performance of the fund at the expense of the fund shareholder. The worst-case scenario of 10 times FTT from effectively one transaction involving a chain of intermediaries, is reflected in the literature (AIMA, 2012; Clifford Chance, 2013) . Empirical research based on market observations provides an important insight into how markets could react to the introduction of FTT, specifically on the effect of transaction taxes on market behaviour. Tobin saw transaction taxes as a way to reduce speculative trading in the currency market (Tobin, 1978) . Speculation destabilizes markets as it shifts the focus away from fundamental values (Tobin, 1978) . Indirect trading taxes burden trades and discourages speculation, as it taxes both positive and negative outcomes. Derivatives have a shorter time horizon and will be affected the most by FTT (Schulmeister, Schratzenstaller & Picek, 2008) .
Transaction taxes reduce trading volumes both upon announcement (Bond, Hawkins & Klemm, 2005) and upon implementation (Umlauf, 1993; Pomeranets & Weaver, 2011) . A change to market volumes negatively affects market liquidity unless market makers are able to sufficiently compensate for the introduction of transaction taxes (Pellizzari & Westerhoff, 2009 ). There is a strong link between variance and volume, and while risk is positively correlated to volume, risk decreases with time (Jorion, 1996) .
Research, however, has not been consistent on the effect of transaction taxes on volatility (Umlauf, 1993; Jones & Seguin, 1997; Bond, Hawkins & Klemm, 2005; Baltagi, Li & Li, 2006; Pomeranets & Weaver, 2011) . The introduction of transaction taxes aims to reduce market volatility, but it has been found to increase, decrease and have a neutral effect. This is counterintuitive to the objectives of FTT. Furthermore, the complexity of investment styles makes forecasting the impact of regulatory reform difficult (Lensberg, Schenk-Hoppé & Ladley, 2015) .
Relocation to avoid transaction taxes will arise, but bias towards home equity (Amadia & Bergin, 2008) would help to counter balance this. The introduction of transaction taxes significantly reduces stock turnover (Becchettia et al., 2014) . Market volatility increases with turnover, and those stocks with a higher beta-value contribute the most to excess volatility (Kasch, 2015) .
In the case of technical analysis, stylized facts indicate that transaction taxes do not eliminate profit (Menkhoff & Taylor, 2007) . The cost of transaction taxes will be marginal for investors if performance can outweigh transaction costs. As for performance, the flowperformance relationship of funds is convex (Siri & Tufano, 1998; Del Guercio & Tkac, 2002 ). This will mean that past fund performance will affect future FTT costs, as high performing funds will encourage more investors. The more convex the flow-performance relationship, the more risk managers will take (Ferreira et al., 2012) . But as the incidence of the tax affects performance, this will be reflected in asset prices. Transaction taxes are shown to consistently reduce asset prices across the board (Schwert & Seguin, 1993; Kupiecs, 1996; Habermeier & Kirilenko, 2003; Matheson, 2011; Brondolo, 2012) .
Differences in performance between active and passive strategies have been noted (Huntera et al., 2014) , with active portfolio strategies attracting higher costs (French, 2008) . Active portfolio strategies should provide greater returns to investors, but this has not always been the case (Tudoraa, 2012) . A significant short-and long-term implication of transaction taxes is their impact on investor returns. Diversification can help to improve overall returns.
However, as costs increase with the introduction of transaction taxes, this may encourage more passive holdings (Rowland, 1998; Lensberg, Schenk-Hoppé & Ladley, 2015) which may negatively affect diversification.
The increase in market trading has shown that there has been a shift in focus from fundamental trading to technical trading (also known as chartist analysis). The use of technical analysis over fundamental analysis is inversely related to time horizons (Menkhoff & Taylor, 2007) . If increasing costs discourage short-term trading, transaction taxes may shift investment analysis back to fundamental analysis.
The European Commission has not quantified the potential loss of value for different category of investors. However, in accordance with the objectives of the Proposal, the Commission recognizes that market behaviour will change and that higher costs will affect profit margins.
To the best of our knowledge, the effect of an FTT on investor returns -although plausible and frequently stated -has not yet been subjected to academic research. The claim that FTT should reduce speculative trading by the industry and lead to financial institutions paying their "fair share", is in obvious contrast to the notion of financial institutions passing the burden on to clients. Not all services and transactions can be located outside the FTT zone.
For customers, the burden might become material, in particular when multiple layers of a transaction chain are taxed and the tax burden cumulates at the level of the final customer 9 (Davis et al., n.d.) . However, no data are available to estimate the extent of shifting in financial markets.
Private fund companies have carried out some estimations on the effect of FTT, based on aggregate data. A study by Oliver Wyman concludes that lower returns clearly affect longterm savings as "rational investors 'price in' the future cost of the FTT into perpetuity" (Davis et al., n.d.: 27) . The Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA) notes that FTT would affect mostly EU private individuals and pensioners. It adds that, on a passive investment in the S&P500 index, if one were to earn an average return of 2%, it would take 18 days in order to recoup an FTT charge of 0.1% (AIMA, 2012: 9) . This would cover the estimated additional effective FTT rate of 2.2%. This would encourage longer-term investments, but would reduce turnover and market liquidity.
Results from retrospective analysis of fixed income and equity portfolios performed by Black 9 "These end-users represent a wide range of 'real-economy' participants, including corporations, governments and long-term investors (pension funds, asset managers and life insurers)". It also includes "retail investors (via direct investment schemes, as well as participation in collective investment schemes, and as beneficiaries of institutional plans". Davis et al. (n.d.) , p. 13.
Rock show that FTT could reduce returns by up to 257 basis points (bps), with the spread dependent on the proportion of equity investments to total investments held within an investment portfolio (Black Rock, 2011) . However, as a private investment fund, their data are not publically available for review. Oxera (2011) uses three illustrations to highlight the effect of FTT on returns.
10 Other institutions such as the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) and the European Repo Council (ERC) support these views.
Based on this evidence from the industry itself, we will shed further light on the effect of FTT on investment fund returns. In contrast to industry studies -some of which have the character of anecdotal evidence, while others serve lobbying purposes -we use unique disaggregate data which allow us to simulate FTT and estimate its effects on a detailed level.
As a first step, our goal is to determine the relative effect of FTT on investment fund total net assets and consequently on investment fund performance. Both are measured by change in total net assets during the period for each fund. In a second step, we analyse which fund characteristics affect the relative amount of FTT. We focus on two specific characteristics, namely the funds risk and the investment strategy.
According to the political claim, as discussed above, FTT increases transaction costs for buyers and sellers of financial instruments, and reduces the number and volume of transactions. Investors are assumed to seek to accommodate additional transaction cost by reducing the volume and the frequency of trading as a first step to avoid the tax. Empirical results do show that trading volumes fall when transaction taxes are introduced (see above).
Investors expect high returns from high-risk investments (Dey, 2005) . Expected returns net of trading costs increase with the holding period, and are therefore inversely related to turnover (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986) . Transaction taxes encourage long-term holdings to dampen costs (Matheson, 2011) . Others suggest that the positive relation between returns and turnover reflect active management that leads to a high turnover (Dey, 2005, quoting various 10 Oxera, 2011: (i) a typical 40-year pension fund would suffer both a loss in returns and retirement value and potentially lose 2.7% to 5.5% of its final value; (ii) a retail investment earning an expected return of 5% could potentially lose 0.8% of its returns due to financial institutions' shifting the burden to investors and due to the cascading effect of FTT; and (iii) a typical manufacturing firm could suffer a 0.74% reduction in profits on a 10% margin on derivatives due to higher derivative costs. authors). Active investors may be affected more by transaction taxes than those undertaking passive investment strategies, which may have a longer investment horizon. Their participation in the market would reflect this. Overall market turnover increases with the number of active investors (Tauchen & Pitts, 1983) . The objective of the Proposal is to encourage stability. If trading volumes are positively related to investment betas (risk) (Ciner, 2015) , then lower volumes would suggest a more stable market. Thus, FTT could help to limit market instability (Carfi & Musolino, 2014) .
We should find that investments with higher risk are subject to higher tax costs. Further, if FTT is to discourage speculative trading, then funds which are managed actively should be affected more than passively managed funds. Our hypothesis therefore read:
H1: The reduction of performance by FTT is higher for funds with a riskier portfolio.
H2: The reduction of performance by FTT is higher for funds with an active management style.
Data and Methodology

Data and Sample Selection
We use data from Austrian investment funds. rather merely an additional institutional layer. We also exclude special funds (Spezialfonds):
they are not available on the market, they serve specific purposes and they are subject to specific rules and limitations. Hedge funds are also excluded from our data. Our data also exclude repos, as Austrian funds have no regulatory obligation to report such transactions.
The information provided by the OeKB comprises end of month time series data of 927 funds covering the 12-month period from January to December 2014. Data are available per fund and per month, and in total comprise 10,393 observations. 12 Our data include monthly totals for all purchases and sales in euro, without netting, separately for bonds, index securities, fund investments, equity shares and derivative products. Data on derivatives are provided on a positive or negative net trade basis. 13 Further, end of month closing total net assets are provided in euro, and monthly performance as percentages. Additional fund characteristics are provided for each observation, which may vary per month, also within one specific investment fund.
14 Table 1 provides a summary of the sample data. We exclude observations with total net assets (TNA) per month-end of zero and with observations with zero performance, which is reported as "n/a". We maintain observations with a monthly performance of zero or virtually zero; 15 however subsequent calculations on the tax effect are shown as "missing value" to avoid error terms or outliers, which distort results. Not all funds had data available for a full 12 months. This may be due to either funds commencing trading later in the year or ceasing trading before year end.
< Insert
13
For our data analysis, we convert all negative values to positives. Derivative values are both negative and positive, with negative values reflecting a net payment obligation.
14 Our data include a mix of investments periods, including investments held for short-(0-3 years), medium-(3-7years) and long-term periods (more than 7 years). Table 2 outlines descriptive statistics for total purchases and sales. Table 2 The FTT that we calculate is underestimated in one regard: the data on purchases and sales of derivatives in euro relate to amounts that are transacted, whereas FTT is really levied on the notional value of the underlying, which is normally considerably higher than the value that is registered on exchanges. Unfortunately, our data do not give information on notional values.
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To simulate the performance after hypothetical FTT, we reduce the monthly performance before FTT by FTT per month related to the month-end TNA. As the performance depends on valuations of assets (total net assets, TNA) held by a fund at the end of a period, it therefore depends on realized and unrealized changes in market values, as well as on dividend and interest income. TNA values are published on a daily basis, and include any reinvested dividends. They are based on the value of total net assets and daily fund price plus any dividend per share. Transaction costs and administrative costs reduce performance, as would FTT. The performance is corrected for fund share splits and for the distributing/nondistributing character of the fund. We also consider the impact of cascading. Based on a worst-case scenario as discussed in the literature, we consider that the above variables based on 10pbs 17 FTT cost, i.e. the effect of FTT would reflect a chain of transactions from start to finish that multiples FTT by 10 (see Figure 1 ).
To analyse the effect of the riskiness of the fund on its FTT-exposure, we use three variables:
fund category (CAT, CATGRP), gilt-edged (GE) and bond risk category (RISK), as follows.
CAT: The fund category ranges between five broad groups: bond funds, money market funds, equity funds, derivative funds and mixed funds. The classification as bond funds or equity funds requires that the majority of the portfolio (51%) be held in bonds or equity, respectively. Money market funds are regulated according to CESR/10-049. 18 Mixed funds are based on non-bond exposure and ignore the derivative position of the fund. Further, a distinction according to duration is drawn. 16 An alternative measure of the effect of FTT on performance measures the reduction in percentage points. As the results in our subsequent descriptive and statistical analysis are the same, we therefore display only results for TWPER1. 17 percentage basis points. 18 Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) guidelines on a Common Definition of European Money Market Funds, CESR/10-049. The CESR's guidelines set out a two-tiered approach for a definition of European money market funds, namely (i) short-term money market funds and (ii) money market funds. "This approach recognises the distinction between short-term money market funds, which operate a very short weighted average maturity and weighted average life, and money market funds which operate with a longer weighted average maturity and weighted average life". CESR, p. 1. CATGRP: We group above CAT variables based on type, by dropping the distinction according to duration. This includes equity, derivatives, mixed, money market and bonds. GE: Highly conservative funds which are adequate, under Austrian law, for the investment to the benefit of wards (e.g. children who lack legal right capacity), are classified as gilt-edged.
As only 3% of funds were observed to be gilt-edged, our data are binary (yes/no).
RISK: Bonds account for 67% of all purchases and 66% of all sales. As only bond funds, mixed funds and money market funds give information on their risk in bonds, the data accordingly show a high percentage of n/a. Our data include triple-A, investment grade and non-investment grade bonds. Classification of funds between different groups is based on a weighted average of bond data, with minimum thresholds for classification set at 51%.
Classifications represent the quality of investments. Investments in AAA bonds have high credit worthiness. Investment grade bonds are the next tier of credit worthiness and have a BBB rating. They are ranked higher in terms of credit worthiness to non-investment grade bonds that have a BB ranking. The latter is the lowest rank for bonds in our sample and carries a higher risk of default for investors. and NINGR, respectively. We thus construct an ordinal variable which considers GE-funds as the least risky, followed by non-GE MINAA, INGR and NINGR as the most risky, in that order (i.e. ranking from 1 to 4). The variable RR is applicable only for money market funds, bond funds and mixed funds.
The investment strategy of the fund can be found in two variables, namely active investment strategy and passive investment strategy.
ACT: The fund's management actively looks for market inefficiencies and invests accordingly. The manager therefore actively decides on timing of investment and on specific stocks, bonds or other instruments. As an active investment strategy is available only for equity funds or mixed funds, therefore, again, we find a large number of n/a. Data provided differentiate between growth style, value style and blend style of management.
PASS: A fund's portfolio normally mirrors components of a market index, and automatically reflects any changes in the underlying index (for example market capitalization, based on the assumption that an individual investor cannot outsmart the market). The data are binary (yes/no).
MGST: We group ACT-and PASS-style management and construct an additional variable on management style. As some funds are classified as neither active or passive (that data entry is not mandatory), we leave them unclassified. 
Tax Wedge: The Absolute and Relative Effect of FTT on Performance and TNA
In our analysis, we differentiate between a best-case and a worst-case scenario. In the bestcase scenario, FTT is levied exactly once upon each transaction. Not even the second leg of the transaction (the counterparty's FTT) is included in the simulation. In the worst-case scenario, we assume that each transaction is the result of a chain of sub-transactions with the incidence of FTT being 10 times, due to the cascading effect, as described above. Both scenarios are equally unrealistic: FTT will neither be levied once, nor will it arise 10 times for each single transaction; the two scenarios merely determine the lower and upper boundaries of the FTT burden. Based on our above thoughts, we assume that in both scenarios, the investor ultimately bears the burden of FTT.
In the best-case scenario, we find that the total cost of FTT is € 89.5 million based on tax rates provided by the Proposal multiplied by sales and purchase values. This would represent 0.062% of tax revenue generated in Austria in 2014, which amounted to €143.7 billion (Statistics Austria). In that scenario, FTT would reduce performance at a median of 0.7% (average 8.12%; TWPER1) (see Table 6 ). 19 The effect on the total net assets is small, as one would expect: the median tax wedge would be 0.00006% (average 0.014%) of TNA. Table 6 about here > It is obvious that these results considerably underestimate the effects of FTT. There are a number of reasons for this. On the one hand, we cannot take into consideration the notional values of derivative transactions or the potential influence of factoring on derivatives, due to lack of data, both of which may significantly increase the tax base for FTT for such instruments. The best-case scenario also excludes the cascading effect of the tax.
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For the worst-case scenario (Table 7) , where we assume that a typical transaction may involve 10 instances of FTT liability, one can easily multiply the results from Table 6 by 10. 20 The median effect of FTT would then be a 7% reduction in fund performance, and even as high as 80% on average. Table 7 about here >
Differences in medians between groups
Graphical illustration
Graphs 1 and 2 show the difference in medians of our categorical variables. Results for fund 19 If the reduction were measured in percentage points, the fund performance before FTT would decrease from 0.525% to 0.511% due to a reduction on average of 0.014 ppt (TWPER2) (median of TWPER2 = 0.006 ppt). 20 We assume a cumulative relation between the 10 FTT-instances; there is no indication that an exponential relation would apply. As transaction taxes have been found to reduce asset prices, we do not account for taxes on taxes.
category show that FTT affects money market funds the most. Investments which are not classified as gilt-edged securities are also affected more than those which are classified as gilt-edged. We also find that investments which have neither active nor passive style management are affected more by FTT than those that do have a declared (active or passive) management style.
<Insert Graphs 1 and 2 about here>
Graphs 3 and 4 show the results from grouping our data. Our results again show that money market funds and funds with no management style classification are the most affected by FTT. As reference to management style is not a mandatory field, details are not always provided by funds.
<Insert Graphs 3 and 4 about here>
We further analyse our data by removing money market funds (which clearly dominate) from fund category (CAT), and compare the duration of bond fund investments. The removal of money market funds from our data clarifies the impact of FTT on other fund categories.
The results for bond fund classification clearly show that FTT will have the greatest impact on short-term bond funds. This is in line with the objectives of FTT to encourage longer-term holdings, as short-term trades increase the cost of FTT on a fund. Graphs 5 and 6 show our results.
<Insert Graphs 5 and 6 about here>
Non-Parametric Testing
The quality of the data requires non-parametric testing, as our data do not have a normal distribution. We use the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney U) test and Kruskal-Wallis test to compare medians between groups that result from our categorical variables. We thus test whether the difference in medians of FTT effects (TWTNA, TWPER1, TWPER2) is significant between the different groups per categorical variable (CAT, GE, RISK, ACT, PASS).
Our results are summarized in Table 8 for the best-case scenario, and in Table 9 for the worst-case scenario, including cascading.
<Insert Table 8 about here>   <Insert Table 9 
about here>
We also group data to highlight our results and test for significance. We group GE and RISK as one variable, RR. We group ACT and PASS as one variable, MGST. We also find that the results for TWPER1 and TWPER2 are similar.
Our results for the best-and worst-case scenarios for grouped data are summarized in Table   10 and Table 11 , respectively.
<Insert Table 10 about here>   <Insert Table 11 
Our results show that both RR and MGST affect the FTT tax wedge. We find that return does not increase uniformly with risk. Our results do show that actively traded funds are affected more by the introduction of FTT than passively managed funds. This is significant, given the additional costs charged to investors for actively managed funds.
We can therefore confirm both of our hypotheses, according to which the effect of FTT on performance and total net assets depends on risk and investment strategy. The results are significant on a 0.01% level.
Conclusion
The understanding of FTT is largely based on estimations of how markets will react based on a number of assumptions. This paper analyses the effects of FTT on funds using Austrian data for the 2014 calendar year as provided by the OeKB. Austria is a keen supporter of the introduction of FTT. Although, at first glance, we might estimate that the effect of FTT on Austrian funds may be marginal, cascading can lead to a reduction of fund performance of up to 80% on average. The gradual growth of the Austrian fund sector over recent years should be considered within the context of the limited adoption of FTT at the European level.
Furthermore, the cascading effect may vary between these boundaries depending on the number of intermediaries in a transaction.
The results highlight that behavioural changes may arise more specifically in certain categories of funds. This may infringe portfolio diversification. However, underlying these observations is confirmation that data do support that the objective of FTT will be meet.
Active strategies may require reassessment. Bonds which have a short-term trading duration will be affected more.
We must also take into perspective the quantum of FTT paid in relation to the overall value of funds traded. After initial market shock, the marginal increase in costs may not be overly significant to investors, but would nonetheless affect investment strategies.
Our results are limited to some extent. We cannot induce the indirect effects of FTT (such as relocation and the decision not to trade at all), nor the potential decision by market participants to increase the holding periods of investments.
Our analysis could be further developed in a number of ways. Further research could highlight specific trades, such as the role that intermediaries play within the financial markets of Austria. This could support the current debate to extend the scope of exemptions to intermediaries in order to reduce the effect of cascading on financial markets. Notes: Data for 927 unique funds with 10,355 observations. Variables with zero outputs were not excluded from the analysis in order to ensure that appropriate comparison was carried out. Furthermore, we retain observations with n/a categories. This is a significant reason for this. The use of n/a could reflect instances where data entries genuinely cannot be included in other categories, but it could also reflect a "garbage" option for data inputters. In both cases, then, it is highly probable that the information that is contained in the other categories is correct and any results of these variables provide results that can be relied upon not to have "garbage" data. We assume that all transactions are undertaken in the secondary market. *Categories have been grouped due to confidentiality. 
